In this paper we present the first biclique cryptanalysis of MIBS block cipher and a new biclique cryptanalysis of PRESENT block cipher. These attacks are performed on full-round MIBS-80 and full-round PRESENT-80. Attack on MIBS-80 uses matching without matrix method and has a data complexity upper bounded by 2 52 chosen plaintext where it reduced security of this cipher about 1 bit. Attack on PRESENT-80 has a data complexity of at most 2 22 chosen plaintexts and computational complexity of 2 79.37 encryptions that both complexities are lower than other cryptanalyses of PRESENT-80 so far.
INTRODUCTION
Along advances in low resource applications such as RFID tags and Internet of Things, lightweight cryptography became a popular field of study to find appropriate solutions to different purposes of security in low resource devices. So far, many block ciphers like MIBS [1] , Lblock [2] and PRESENT [3] are introduced to satisfy conditions of constrained applications. Biclique cryptanalysis of block ciphers introduced by Andrey Bogdanov et al. [4] . After that, many studies have been done on security of different lightweight ciphers against biclique attack ([5] , [6] , [7] , [8] ,).
The best known attack on PRESENT-80 is also a biclique cryptanalysis which covers all rounds of PRESENT-80 and has data complexity equals to 2 25 chosen plaintext and computational complexity equals to 2 79.49 with success probability equal to 100% [7] . Also there are other biclique cryptanalysis of PRESENT ( [9] , [7] , [10] Cryptanalysis which covers 19 rounds of MIBS with data complexity equals to 2 57.87 chosen plaintext and computational complexity equal to 2 74.23 encryption of 19 rounds of MIBS with success probability equal to 90% [11] . There are also other cryptanalysis of MIBS( [12] , [11] , [13] ) . In this paper we will present the biclique cryptanalysis of MIBS-80 and PRESENT-80. These attacks are in single key mode.
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2. provides description of MIBS-80 cipher. Section 3 shows the key recovery attack on full-round MIBS-80. A brief description of PRESENT-80 cipher is provided in section 4. Biclique Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-80 is presented in section 5. A conclusion of this paper is given in section 6.
DESCRIPTION OF MIBS
Block cipher MIBS uses a standard Feistel structure with 64-bit block length and supports user key of lengths 64-bit and 80-bit. Each round function of MIBS consists of a key addition layer, a nibble-wise S-box layer , and a mixing layer can be represented by a simple matrix production M : 
The second related-key differential in the decryption path is also generated by 16 possible differences of four bits [11, 10, 9, 8] of state 28 each of them represented by ∆ K[ j] , 0 ≤ j ≤ 15 . As it can be seen in Fig. 1 , these two related-key differentials share no active S-boxes, So they can be used to make an independent biclique, which covers 2 8 
Fig. 1 4-dimension Biclique for MIBS over rounds 28-32

Matching without Matrix
The Matching without matrix method presented in [14] could reduce the computational complexity of the matching nibbles recomputation. According to the Feistel structure of MIBS cipher, we have
, which M and S represent the operation of mix and substitution layer . Also, it could be easily derived that
. So we have the equality
leads to the equality
.
In our attack, we choose the L 14 (left part of data register in round 15 that is the input of F-function in round 15) as matching point. So we can choose the data corresponding to the 4 th and the 5 th S-boxes in round 14 and their corresponding Sboxes in round 16 which mean the 4 th and the 5 th S-boxes in round 16 as matching variable
B. The attack procedure
Step -choose C 0 = 0 (64) as ciphertext and decrypt it to round 28 using K[0, 0] to obtain S 0 , the data register in round 28 (i.e. L 27 and R 27 ).
-Decrypt C 0 with keys
, to obtain S j (in the input of round 28).
-Encrypt S0 with keys
Step Data complexity. According to Fig. 1, 3 nibbles of ciphertext is not effected by key differences. So the data complexity will not exceed 2 64−12 = 2 52 chosen plaintexts. Computational complexity. In step 1, 24 × (19 + 6) + 15 = 415 S-boxes, in step 2, 24 × (34 + 24 × (71)) = 18720 S-boxes plus 24 × (9 + 24 × (80)) = 20624 S-boxes are computed. In key schedule 24 × (3 + 9) + 52 = 244 S-boxes are computed. Also there is 1 candidate key per each key set in average. The MIBS-80 uses 320 S-boxes in a full round encryption, so the computational complexity is as follow: Since we used all keys in this attack, its success probability is 100 
Sieve-In-The-Middle
To cryptanalysis the PRESENT block cipher we use the Sieve-In-The-Middle attack [12] and we use the sieve introduced in [11] . In this sieve we choose 16 left most bits of input of a subcipher Es=SLPLAKSL for input, and bits in positions (63,62,61,60,47,46,45,44,37,36,35,34,15,14,13,12) for the key and output, as is shown in Fig. 4 . Prestored values of inputs and outputs of this superbox and their corresponding keys could be used as matching variables to filter out wrong keys.
The attack procedure
Step 1:Constructing biclique. Similar to step 1 of section 3.2 and by assuming C 0 = 0 (64) and internal state S in round 28, we construct S j ,0 ≤ j ≤ 15 and C i ,0 ≤ i ≤ 15 and their corresponding P i ,0 ≤ i ≤ 15 .
Step The success probability of this attack is 100
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we presented the first independent biclique attack on full-round MIBS-80 and a new independent biclique attack on PRESENT-80. The attack on MIBS-80 uses matching without matrix method with biclique cryptanalysis for the first time, and results in reduction of the ciphers security about 1 bit. The attack on PRESENT-80 uses advantages of Sieve-In-The-Middle attack and results data and computational complexities better than other introduced attacks on full round PRESENT-80 so far.
